Abstract. We show that oblivious transfer of bits from A to B can be obtained from a single instance of the same primitive from B to A.
Introduction
Modern cryptography is an increasingly broad discipline and deals with many subjects besides the classical tasks of encryption or authentication. An example is multi-party computation, where two or more parties, mutually distrusting each other, want to collaborate in a secure way in order to achieve a common goal, for instance, to carry out an electronic election. An example of a specific multi-party computation is secure function evaluation, where every party holds an input to a function, and the output should be computed in a way such that no party has to reveal unnecessary information about her input.
A primitive of particular importance in the context of two-and multi-party computation is oblivious transfer. In classical Rabin oblivious transfer [18] or Rabin OT for short, one of the parties-the sender -sends a bit b which reaches the receiver with probability 1/2; the sender hereby remains ignorant of about whether the message has arrived or not. In other words, Rabin OT is nothing else than a binary erasure channel. Another variant of oblivious transfer is chosen one-out-of-two oblivious transfer -2 1 −OT for short-, where the sender sends two bits b 0 and b 1 and the receiver's input is a choice bit c; the latter then learns b c but gets no information about the other bit b 1−c . Chosen one-out-oftwo oblivious transfer can be generalized to a primitive where the sender sends n messages, k of which the receiver can choose to read: chosen k-out-of-n l-bit string oblivious transfer or n k −OT l . One reason for the importance of oblivious transfer is its universality, i.e., it allows, in principle, for carrying out any twoparty computation [13] .
Besides computational cryptographic security, which is based on the assumed hardness of certain computational problems and a limitation on the adversary's computing power, there also exists unconditional security, which is based on the fact that the information the potential adversary obtains is limited. This latter type of security withstands attacks even by a computationally unlimited adversary; clearly, it is, a priori, more desirable to realize cryptographic primitives in such an unconditionally secure way. Unfortunately, oblivious transfer is impossible to achieve in an unconditionally secure way from scratch, i.e., between parties connected by a noiseless channel; in fact, not even if this is a quantum channel over which the parties can exchange not only "classical" bits but quantum states [14] . However, if some additional weak and realistic primitives are available such as noisy channels and noisy correlations, then unconditional security can be often achieved [6] , [5] , [7] , [12] , [21] , [22] .
Another way of realizing unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is from (a weaker form of) oblivious transfer itself: All the variants of oblivious transfer have been shown equivalent to different extents. For instance, 2 1 −OT can be reduced to m realizations of Rabin OT as long as a failure probability of 2 −m can be accepted [4] . On the other hand, 1 −OT-with or without failure probability, where the reduction can be made more efficient in terms of the hidden constant if a small probability of failure can be accepted [3] . In [1] , a protocol was presented that reduces In [17] and [8] , methods were proposed for obtaining has to be tolerated. The protocol of [17] is based on the realization of so-called "XOT" (i.e., the receiver can also choose to receive the XOR of the two bits sent) from two realizations of 
Our Contribution
In [8] , Crépeau and Sántha raised the question of whether it is possible to implement oblivious transfer in one direction using fewer instances of oblivious transfer in the other. In this paper, we answer this question with yes by presenting a protocol that needs one instance of oblivious transfer, one bit of communication and one bit of additional (local) randomness. All these parameters are optimal. Our reduction is very simple; in other words, the reversed version of oblivious transfer is basically just another way of looking at it. The symmetry is already there, oblivious transfer is symmetric.
Our reduction can be used to transform any protocol for 2 1 −OT-offering either computational or information-theoretic security for A and B, respectively-into a protocol for oblivious transfer from B to A having exactly the same security both for A and B as the original protocol; no additional failure can occur.
Outline
In Section 3, we first present protocols from [1] that allow 2 1 −OT to be "stored", i.e., to transform oblivious transfer into an oblivious key. Then, we will show that such an oblivious key can very easily be reversed-by a simple XOR executed by both players on their local data. It follows that oblivious transfer can be reversed equally easily. In Section 4 we present an even simpler protocol for reversing oblivious transfer and prove its security.
Definitions and Security
We define For the reversed version of 2 1 −OT, where B is the sender and A is the receiver, we will write 2 1 −TO. This black-box model of oblivious transfer is called the ideal model, and it is how the world is supposed to be: The players have no other way of accessing the box than by the defined inputs and outputs: cheating is impossible. However, in reality such a perfect box does normally not exist. It must be simulated by a protocol. In this real model, the players can cheat in principle by not following the rules. A protocol is called a secure implementation of oblivious transfer if an adversary cannot do anything in the real model that he could not just as well have done in the ideal model. Thus, it must be shown that for any adversary in the real model, there exists an equivalent adversary in the ideal model: he gets the same information and the honest player obtains the same outputs as in the real model; the resulting views are indistinguishable.
We follow the formalism of [15] and [1] (see also [10] ) to define when a protocol perfectly securely evaluates a function f : X × Y → U × V. A protocol is a pair of algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that can interact by two-way message exchange. A pair (A 1 , A 2 ) of algorithms is admissible for protocol A if at least one of the parties is honest, i.e., if A 1 = A 1 or A 2 = A 2 holds. (Note that in the case where both parties are cheaters, no security is required.) By z, we denote some additional auxiliary input that can potentially be used by both parties. For instance, z could include information about previous executions of the protocol. Note, however, that an honest party never makes use of z.
The Ideal Model. In the ideal model, the two parties can make use of a trusted party to calculate the function. The algorithms B 1 and B 2 of the protocol B = (B 1 , B 2 ) receive the inputs x and y, respectively, and the auxiliary input z. They send values x and y to the trusted party, who sends them back the values u and v -satisfying (u , v ) = f (x , y ). Finally, B 1 and B 2 output the values u and v. The two honest algorithms B 1 and B 2 always send x = x and y = y to the trusted party, and always output u = u and v = v . Now, if B = (B 1
is the resulting output pair, given the inputs x and y and the auxiliary input z.
The Real Model. In the real model, the parties have to compute f by a protocol Π = (A 1 , A 2 ) without the help of a trusted party. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an admissible pair for A. Then the joint execution of Π under A in the real model,
Perfect Security: "Real = Ideal". A protocol Π computes a function f perfectly securely if, intuitively speaking, every "real" cheater has an equally powerful counterpart in the ideal model. Definition 2 also applies to reduction protocols from one functionality to another; here, the algorithms are allowed to call an oracle which perfectly implements the given functionality.
Definition 2. A protocol Π computes f perfectly securely if for every admissible A = (A 1 , A 2 ) there exists an admissible B = (B 1 , B 2 )-as efficient as A 1 and with identical set of honest players-such that for all x ∈ X , x ∈ Y, and z ∈ Z,
holds, where ≡ means that the distributions are identical.
Storing and Reversing Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer protocols rely either on tools borrowed from public-key cryptography [18] , [9] or on additional assumptions [2] , [5] , [19] , [3] , [22] . In the first case, we have to deal with relatively slow algorithms which may be the bottleneck of the protocol execution. In the second case, one depends on these additional assumptions being present at the time of the execution of the protocol. In both cases it is, therefore, desirable to carry out as much of the computation as possible in advance, and to make the actual execution of oblivious transfer as fast and simple as possible, based on this pre-computation. Actually, almost the entire computation can be done beforehand: Protocols 1 and 2, proposed in [1] , show how 2 1 −OT can be transformed into a so-called oblivious key, and vice versa. An oblivious key is, intuitively speaking, the distribution that arises when A and B choose their inputs at random and execute When the symbols of U and V are renamed in a suitable way, the distribution corresponds to the one arising when Shannon's so-called "noisy-typewriter 
A formal proof of the security of this transformation is omitted here. Intuitively, the privacy of both players is preserved since the ignorance of one player about the XOR of X 0 and X 1 is transformed into the ignorance of C, and vice versa.
Optimally Reversing Oblivious Transfer
The protocol outlined in the end of Section 3 requires three bits of additional communication. We present an even simpler protocol, Protocol 3, using only one bit of additional communication from A to B; this is optimal. 2 , c ∈ {0, 1}, and z ∈ Z,
Let now the first party be honest, i.e., A = (A 1 , A 2 ). In the real model, A 2 receives (c, z) and sends (a 0 , a 1 ) = a(c, z) to Since
we have, for all (b 0 , b 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 , c ∈ {0, 1}, and z ∈ Z,
Assume now that the second party is honest, i.e., A = (A 1 , A 2 ). In the real model, The honest player will output l ⊕ m ⊕ cd. Since l = r ⊕ dc and r is uniform and independent of everything else, l is uniform and independent as well, which means that it has the same joint distribution as l with everything else. Therefore we have, for all (b 0 , b 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 , c ∈ {0, 1}, and z ∈ Z,
Obviously, the simulated adversary is as efficient as the real adversary. 2
Our protocol is optimal: First of all, since it is impossible to construct unconditionally secure oblivious transfer from scratch, using a single instance of 
Oblivious Linear-Function Evaluation
In contrast to 2 1 −OT, all the other forms of oblivious transfer cannot be reversed without loss, i.e., in the perfect single-copy sense of Sections 3 and 4. This can easily be seen from the monotones, defined in [23] : A primitive can only be reversed without loss if
1 −OT is the only example of n k −OT l having this property. In this section, we present another natural generalization of oblivious transfer to strings that can be reversed perfectly: oblivious linear-function evaluation over GF (q) or GF (q)−OLFE for short. Roughly speaking, the sender's input is a linear function f : x → y = a 0 + a 1 x, where a 0 , a 1 , x, y ∈ GF (q), and the receiver's input is an argument x ∈ GF (q) for which he then learns the evaluation of the function, y = f (x) (see Figure 3) . GF (q)−OLFE is a special case of oblivious polynomial evaluation [16] . It can easily be verified that GF (2)−OLFE is equivalent to 2 1 −OT. Furthermore, [19] shows that with one instance of GF (q)−OLFE a very simple commitment scheme can be implemented, which allows to commit to a value x ∈ GF (q). The scheme is perfectly hiding and 1/q-binding. The protocols of Sections 3 and 4 generalize to GF (q)−OLFE in a straightforward way: GF (q)−OLFE is, as oblivious transfer, equivalent to a non-interactive key-and can, therefore, be stored in the same sense. Moreover, this key is, as 2 1 −OK, symmetric. Hence, GF (q)−OLFE from A to B can be reduced to GF (q)−OLFE from B to A-GF (q)−EFLO for short-in a perfect and singlecopy sense. Protocol 4 is, in addition, optimal with respect to the required communication. 
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that chosen one-out-of-two bit oblivious transfer can be optimally reversed very easily. Furthermore, we have have presented a more general primitive with the same property: oblivious linear-function evaluation.
